Jihad in Classical Sunni Islam – an Overview
Muslims define jihad in Arabic as “holy struggle.” An often neglected matter is the plurality of meanings of jihad in early Islam, which includes both combative and non-combative jihad. Jihad takes many forms, including controlling one’s anger, studying at school, supporting one’s family financially, and any other efforts in a Muslim’s life that contributes to good. Almost all manifestations of jihad are non-combative and far more numerous than the combative form, which consists of defensive and offensive jihad.
The Sunni View of Jihad
Scholars from the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence (Hanafi, Shafi’i, Maliki, Hanbali) differ in their views of combative jihad. According to author Ahmad al-Dawoody, the majority of religious scholars in the four Sunni schools view jihad as a defense against aggression:
“Qur’anic casus belli are restricted to aggression against Muslims and fitnah, that is, persecution of Muslims because of their religious belief (Qur’an 2:190; 2:193; 4:75; 22:39-40). War and coercion are not means by which religion may be propagated because belief in a religion is only a matter of the conviction of the heart (Qur’an 2:256; 10:99; 16:93; 18:29). Fighting non-Muslims solely because they do not believe in Islam contradicts the Qur’anic injunction (Qur’an 2:256).”[]
While defensive jihad was a personal obligation, offensive jihad was a communal obligation proclaimed by the ruler. The latter did not always mean perpetual warfare, but also meant, in certain situations, to be in a prepared state of battle. Jihad was a battle between armies and followed specific limits, including the non-targeting of civilians. According to author and scholar, Asma Afsaruddin, the plurality of meanings of jihad in Islam’s earlier years gradually narrowed in meaning to the combative form due to geo-political exigencies of the time:
“By the early Abassid period – roughly the mid-to-late eighth-century CE, second century of Islam – the military aspect of jihad began to receive greater emphasis in certain official and juridical circles.”[]
Religious jurists used the Islamic sources and resorted to abrogation, believing that Qur’anic verses calling for combat abrogated the peaceful verses. This view, however, was not shared by all scholars, and, contrary to Islamophobes, does not represent the view of the Muslim majority today.
War as Part of the Norm
Were only Muslims prone to war? Combative jihad was adopted through Islam’s history for various reasons, including spreading what Muslims believed was God’s word. War, however, was not unique to Islam and Muslims. The Muslim expansion in early Islam, as well as later wars, is to be understood in the context of the geo-political environment in those times. David Dakake says,
“When Islam spread out of Arabia in the seventh century…warfare and conflict were the normal state of affairs between nations and peoples. The state of nearly constant warfare was simply the ‘way of the world’ and peace was the extraordinary and occasional exception to the rule.”[]
Justification for war found religious justification as jihad in Islam, just as “Just War” was formulated to justify war in Christianity.
Non-Muslims Under Muslim Rule
The promotion of combative jihad notwithstanding, this did not mean forced conversion. Mustafa Akyol says,
“with the exception of a few cases – such as the fanatic Almohavids in North Africa – forced conversion remained anathema to Islamdom.”[]
Historian Ira Lapidus says,
“…the Arab-Muslims did not, contrary to reputation, attempt to convert people to Islam. Muhammad had set the precedent of permitting Jews and Christians in Arabia to keep their religions, if they paid tribute; the Caliphate extended the same privileges to Middle Eastern Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians, whom they considered ‘People of the Book,’ the adherents of earlier written revelations […].”[]
Author Thomas Arnold says,
“These stupendous conquests which laid the foundations of the Arab empire, were certainly not the outcome of a holy war […].”[]
Similarly, historian Marshall Hodgson says,
“There was no attempt at converting the peoples of the imperial territories, who practically adhered to some form of confessional religion already.”[]
Christians and Jews, and later followers of other religions, deemed “People of the Book” by Islam, were permitted to practice their religion in their places of worship while paying a tax to receive exemption from joining the army and full protection by the Muslim government in the event of an attack.
“The poll-tax or jizya,” Dakake says, “was required to be paid by the People of the Book to the Islamic state” and “unlike feudal taxation in Europe, did not constitute an economic hardship for non-Muslims living under Muslim rule.” He continues, “The tax was seen as the legitimate right of the Islamic state, given that all peoples – Muslim and non-Muslim – benefited from the military protection of the state, the freedom of the roads, and trade, etc.” Muslims also had to contribute. “Although the jizya was paid by non-Muslims, Muslims were also taxed through the zakat, a required religious tax not levied on other communities.”[]
The Petering Out of Offensive Jihad
Offensive jihad or perpetual warfare was also not the preferred choice for rulers after a certain period. Author and scholar Khalid Blankenship says that wars became unsustainable over time, which was partially responsible for the demise of the Umayyad state during the reign of Hisham ibn `Abd al-Malik. This led to a “permanent restructuring of Muslim political praxis away from a scheme of permanent warfare against non-Muslims, to one which came, over time, to include protracted truces, formal diplomatic relations, and, in the modern world, membership in the international community of nation-states.”[]
Non-Muslims Helped Muslims in Jihad
Islamophobes and “Muslim” terrorists portray a bipolar Muslim versus non-Muslim affair. However, Ian Almond, author of Two Faiths One Banner: When Muslims Marched with Christians Across Europe’s Battlegrounds, discusses the “under-reported phenomenon of Muslim-Christian military alliances,” including
“the thousands of Arabs who fought for medieval Christian emperors outside the walls of Milan and Bologna, the Castilians and Catalans who regularly allied themselves with Muslims to fight their Christian neighbors, the extraordinary level of Turkish co-operation in the last century of the Byzantine empire, the equally extraordinary number of Christian soldiers in the Ottoman armies which occupied the Balkans, and the tens of thousands of Hungarian Protestants, not to mention disaffected Hungarian peasants, who marched with the armies of the Turk on Vienna.”[]
Similarly, Akyol says,
“local Christians…actively helped the Muslim conquests. When Byzantine-ruled Damascus was besieged by the Arab army in 634, the city’s Monophysite bishop secretly informed the Muslim commander, Khalid, that the east gate of the city was weakly defended, and he supplied the Muslim troops with ladders for scaling the walls.”[]
Moreover, “Christian Arabs from tribes such as the Banu Tayyi of Najd, the Banu al-Namir ibn Qasit of the upper Euphrates river valley, and the Banu Lakhm participated in the jihad with the Muslim armies.”[] It is important to note that many wars did not necessarily count as jihad, while many wars waged by Muslims were against other Muslims.
Caliphs Were Tolerated More Than Supported
While reasons for offensive jihad are debated by both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, it has been established earlier that most of the caliphs who undertook combative jihad were not necessarily supported by the masses, and more than a few were not in line with Islamic teachings.
The collective actions of caliphs, therefore, should not be understood as the genuine expression of Islam. Moreover, the delicate relationship between the caliphs and religious scholars demonstrates more tension than collaboration. The religious scholars had the unenviable role of keeping the ruler in check and risking life and limb in the process. Religious scholars generally did not agree with the power-hungry goals of certain caliphs, but made decisions based on what they believed to be in the collective interests of the wider Muslim community.
The Pseudo-“jihads” of Today: Contradicting Classical Sunni Tradition
Now that an overview of classical Sunni jihad has been provided, this section will compare the understanding and actions of militants today with combative jihad as understood and undertaken by classical Sunni Muslims of the past.
Advocacy of Peace Over War Today as the Norm
The geo-political context in the past hundreds of years has evolved. It is not the same as the time of Prophet Muhammad, or the time of the Crusades. Unlike most of the past 1,000-plus years, peace, not war, is generally the normal state of affairs today.
Even if offensive jihad occurred in Islam’s history, this does not mean most Muslims wish to promote combat today. Contrary to Islamophobes and “Muslim” terrorists, the Muslim majority is not interested in waging combat on others, but living peacefully like most of the world’s people. “Gallup’s polling of Muslims worldwide determined that the vast majority of respondents (93 percent) belong to the mainstream who believe the 9/11 attacks were not justified.”[]
This is not just the opinion of the Muslim masses, but also of prominent contemporary Sunni scholars. Several such scholars in a Peace Conference in Turkey in 2010 discussed how Ibn Taymiyah’s Fatwa of Mardin was misunderstood and misused by militants to wage violence. Among the conclusions of the New Mardin Declaration was a declaration of peace:
“The classification of abodes in Islamic jurisprudence was a classification based onijtihad (juristic reasoning) that was necessitated by the circumstances of the Muslim world, then and the nature of the international relations prevalent at that time. However, circumstances have changed now: The existence of recognized international treaties, which consider as crimes wars that do not involve repelling aggression or resisting occupation; the emergence of civil states which guarantee, on the whole, religious, ethnic and national rights, have necessitated declaring, instead, the entire world as a place of tolerance and peaceful co-existence between all religions, groups and factions in the context of establishing common good and justice amongst people, and wherein they enjoy safety and security with respect to their wealth, habitations and integrity. This is what the Shari‘ah has been affirming and acknowledging, and to which it has been inviting humanity, ever since the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) migrated to Madina and concluded the first treaty/peace agreement that guaranteed mutual and harmonious co-existence between the factions and various ethnic/race groups in a framework of justice and common/shared interest. Shortcomings and breaches perpetrated by certain states that happen to scar and mar this process cannot and should not be used as a means for denying its validity and creating conflict between it and the Islamic Shari‘ah.”[]
These scholars did not advocate perpetual warfare against non-Muslims, but peace, in the current world of nation-states. Dakake reaffirms:
“Today, in the modern world, the situation is somewhat reversed: we might say that ‘peace’ is generally the norm and warfare, although not exactly extraordinary, is somewhat less of a constant that it was in ancient times. This fact has led the vast majority of Muslim scholars today to declare that continual, offensive jihad is no longer applicable to the contemporary situation and that jihad today is primarilydifa’i or defensive, because the world is itself in a different state from what it was in the seventh century.”[]
Conflicts today involving “Muslims” are usually against other Muslims – not non-Muslims. The majority of al-Qa’eda’s victims have been Muslim, in spite of their rhetoric of attacking the “infidel.” A 2009 study, Deadly Vanguards: A Study of al-Qa’ida’s Violence Against Muslims, by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, states:
“The results show that non‐Westerners are much more likely to be killed in an al‐Qa’ida attack. From 2004 to 2008, only 15% percent of the 3,010 victims were Western. During the most recent period studied the numbers skew even further. From 2006 to 2008, only 2% (12 of 661 victims) are from the West, and the remaining 98% are inhabitants of countries with Muslim majorities. During this period, a person of non‐Western origin was 54 times more likely to die in an al‐Qa’ida attack than an individual from the West. The overwhelming majority of al‐Qa’ida victims are Muslims living in Muslim countries, and many are citizens of Iraq, which suffered more al‐Qa’ida attacks than any other country courtesy of the al‐Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) affiliate.”[]
Therefore, most “Muslim” countries today live peacefully with non-Muslim countries, and most casualties by Muslim attacks today – including al-Qa’eda attacks if they are even considered Muslim – are other Muslims.
This is contrary to the views of Islamophobes who allege that classical Sunni Muslims today support violent “jihad” in some form against non-Muslims, which they strangely consider a continuation of centuries of jihad of the past. To do so is to mix geo-political contexts, to fail to distinguish the nuances of both, and is analogous to judging Christians today by the geo-political context of Christians in the times of the Crusades.
Jihad versus Terrorism
Even if the political realm of classical Islam is understood as an ideology, does it necessarily mean that militants who wage violence today are following the same ideology? To assume so is to have an erroneous understanding. The following examples illustrate key differences between jihad and terrorism:
Jihad today is not proclaimed by rulers, but by “Muslim” vigilantes
The minority of violent Islamists (“jihadists”) do not follow the rules of combative jihad in classical Islam. A ruler is not necessary for them to declare jihad, and they are not members of armies. There is no leader of a nation-state in the world today calling for an offensivejihad against any government or follower of other religions.
Militants today do not protect places of worship
Militants today do not spare but target places of worship, including churches, Buddha statues, mosques, and even graves and tombs (especially of Muslim saints) that they see as places of “worship” by millions of Muslims worldwide. The Boko Haram and other radicals in Pakistan’s tribal areas are examples.
Barring a few aberrations from the norm, this is in contrast to how Muslims preserved and protected the places of worship of non-Muslims throughout Islam’s history. In this respect, militants are very unlike early Muslims and follow the historical aberration instead of the norm.
For example, when an Umayyad ruler, Walid Abd al-Malik, claimed property that belonged to a church in Damascus and turned it into a mosque, Umar bin Abd al-Aziz instructed that the portion of the mosque be destroyed and returned to Christians.[]
Commenting on the following Qur’anic verse, “And had God not repelled one group of people from another, the cloisters, synagogues, churches, and mosques in which God’s name is mentioned in abundance would have been ruined” (Qur’an 22:40), Imam Abu Bakr al-Jassas quotes the famous Imam al-Hassan al-Basri:
“God uses the believers as a means of preventing the destruction of the places of worship belonging to the non-Muslim citizens.”[]
Regarding non-Muslim places of worship, even Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyah, the loyal student of Ibn Taymiyah, says,
“God uses the believers to defend their places of worship….Moreover, it is obligatory for him [the believer] to defend their objects of worship, even though he detests them.”[]
Militants today not only clash with classical Sunni tradition in this respect, but also oppose the words of controversial scholars whom they deceitfully claim to emulate.
Militants today kill innocent civilians
Militants today target armies and civilians, have described all of their violence as “defensive,” have invented their own rules – for example, only combatants can speak on rules of combat – and discard or selectively and deceptively use Sunni tradition to achieve their aims. Therefore, expansion of Islam is not comparable to combat by al-Qa’eda and other terrorists groups today. Rather, in the absence of traditional Sunni rules of war, and an all-out war against the “enemy,” with most of the dead being Muslim, they are guilty of violating and perverting, and not following, classical Sunni Islam.
Militants demean and target religious scholars and knowledge
Scholar and author, Joas Wagemakers, says,
“There seems to be a growing trend among jihadis to view fighters as being the most credible Muslims to comment on jihad, in spite of their lack of scholarly credentials.”[]
The lack of respect of religious scholars has already been seen by their utmost marginalization by even peaceful Islamists, as explained above.
The opposition by militants to Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, well-known for his religious knowledge among extremist circles, illustrates the point. Scoffing at religious scholars, a central part of the militant outlook, elevates combat over belief, and ridicules Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, including:
“Scholars [of religious knowledge] are the inheritors of the Prophets.”[]
He did not say that those who combat are the heirs of the prophets. Prophet Muhammad was also asked,
“`What is the best deed?’ He responded, ‘Belief in Allah and His Messenger […].’”[]
Likewise, Islamists scoff at Sunni tradition by prioritizing politics over religion.
Many militants understand combat experience as a prerequisite to speaking about creed and other religious knowledge – a complete reversal of Sunni Islam that requires correct creed as a first priority and prerequisite to other Islamic practices. Prophet Muhammad also forbade targeting religious figures in a legitimate jihad. Abd Allah ibn Abbas said, “When the Messenger of Allah…would dispatch his troops he would say [to them], “Do not act treacherously, do not steal the spoils of war, do not disfigure the dead bodies, and do not kill children and priests.”[] This partially explains why Pakistani scholars today find it difficult to speak against terrorism waged by the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qa’eda. Their fate would be the same as Barelwi scholar, Sarfraz Na’eemi, and Deobandi scholar, Hassan Jan, who were killed by militants for speaking against terrorism, including suicide bombings.
Militants make combat a pillar of Islam
The first pillar of Islam, the Testification of Faith (“There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah”) is replaced with so-called combative jihad as the first pillar, or is portrayed by militants as being a pillar of Islam. `Abd-al-Salam al-Faraj, for example, in “The Neglected Duty” appeared to see combative jihad as the sixth pillar of Islam.
However, jihad is not a pillar of Sunni Islam and never has been. Asma Afsaruddin says that “the Medinan scholar `Abdallah ibn `Umar, son of the second caliph `Umar ibn al-Khattab, is on record as having challenged those who had wished to elevate combative jihad to the level of a religious obligation. An Iraqi man came to Ibn `Umar and reproached him thus: “What is the matter with you that you perform the hajj and `umra but have abandoned fighting in the path of God (al-ghazu fi sabil allah)?’ To which Ibn `Umar responded, ‘Fie on you! Faith is founded on five pillars: that you worship God, perform the prayer, give zakat, perform the pilgrimage, and fast during Ramadan[…].”[]
Militants kill ambassadors
Whereas militants target embassies, consulates, and foreign dignitaries, Abdallah bin Mas’ud said,
“It is an established Sunna that ambassadors are not to be killed.”[]
It is also recorded in classical Sunni sources that when representatives of Musaylima, who claimed prophethood, visited the Prophet Muhammad as diplomats, Prophet Muhammad did not kill them or instruct others to kill them.[] Militants today do the opposite of what Prophet Muhammad did.
As illustrated above, to conflate the jihad of classical Sunni Islam with the violent actions of terrorists today, is have an erroneous understanding.
How Militants Lie About the Justification for Killing non-Muslims
Militants misinterpret and abuse the genuine meaning of evidence from the Islamic sources to justify their violence. Sunni scholar, Shaykh Faraz Khan, explains the context and correct meaning of the following hadith:
“I was ordered to fight people until they bear witness that there is no deity except Allah and that Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah; establish the ritual prayer; and pay almsgiving. So if they do that, their lives and wealth are safe from me, except for a right recognized in Islam. Their accounting, however, will be with Allah.” [Bukhari, Muslim]
Shaykh Faraz says:
“Unfortunately, this text is often grossly misinterpreted as calling for continuous “holy war” against all non-Muslims until and unless they become Muslim. But examination of context and scholarly interpretation reveals that the hadith by no means refers to all people and is not calling for any sort of war, holy or unholy. The key to understanding the hadith, then, is to understand who exactly is meant by the word ‘people’ in the statement, ‘I was ordered to fight people.’
“This same hadith has various narrations as recorded by different hadith scholars. Imam Nasa’i’s narration reads: ‘I was ordered to fight the polytheists’ rather than the word ‘people,’ and it is an established principle in hadith methodology that various narrations of the same hadith serve to clarify its actual meaning. Hence, the narration of Imam Nasa’i indicates that the word ‘people’ in the first narration does not refer to all people, but rather a specific group of people, namely, certain polytheists. This understanding is confirmed by both the Qur’an and the Sunna, as many incidents in the life of the Prophet [peace and blessings be upon him] clearly show that all of humanity was not intended in the hadith.
“This understanding is also confirmed by our codified legal tradition, which is a reflection of the Qur’an and Sunna. Imam Abu Hanifa and his legal school limited this hadith to only the polytheists among the Arabs. And Imam Malik and his legal school limited it to only the Quraysh tribe among them. [Ibn Battal, Sharh al-Bukhari]
“That is to say, according to both schools of law, all non-Arabs are excluded from the hadith – whether polytheists, atheists, Jews, Christians, or otherwise. Among the Arabs, any group that does not worship idols are also excluded, whether Jews, Christians, Magians, or otherwise. Only Arab polytheists – or perhaps just the tribe of Quraysh among them – were being addressed by the Messenger [peace and blessings be upon him]. Incidentally, the Hanafi and Maliki schools historically and up to today have constituted the vast majority of the Muslim world.
“Imam Kasani, the eminent 6th-century Hanafi jurist, explains that the reasoning of this position is based on the difference between Arab polytheists and all other peoples, including People of the Book [i.e., Jews and Christians, Arab or non-Arab] and non-Arab polytheists. With respect to peoples other than Arab polytheists, it is hoped that by mutual coexistence between them and Muslims, they will be drawn to Islam after reflecting over the beauty of the religion and its Sacred Law [shari’a]. [f: And that hope is sufficient; whether they become Muslim or not is irrelevant to the Hanafi and Maliki perspective that they are not addressed by the hadith.]
The nature of Arab polytheists, however, was to reject anything that conflicted with their customs and traditions, deeming all else to be madness and worthy of scornful ridicule. They were a people – as repeatedly mentioned in the Qur’an – that refused to reflect over anything but ‘the ways of their forefathers.’ Therefore, because the Messenger of Allah [peace and blessings be upon him] was from their same tribe and knew them intimately, he gave them no option but acceptance of Islam or fighting [f: And this statement, of course, was after years of being oppressed by those Arab polytheists]. [Kasani, Bada’i al-Sana’i].”
The “Verse of the Sword” (9:5)
Verse 9:5 in the Qur’an states:
“And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them and capture them and besiege them and sit in wait for them at every place of ambush. But if they should repent, establish prayer, and give zakah, let them [go] on their way. Indeed, Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.”
Militants use verse 9:5 to ‘justify’ killing non-Muslims and Islamophobes believe them. Shaykh Faraz Khan refutes this understanding from scholars of Sunni tradition and says,
“…the Verse of the Sword deals specifically with the situation of Meccan polytheists breaking peace treaties and openly declaring war on the Muslim polity. The verse, then, commands the Muslim state to take up arms and defend itself against those that breached their covenants and attacked out of treachery.
“This explanation is confirmed by the most reliable Imams of Qur’anic exegesis [tafsir], including Imam Razi, Imam Jamal, Imam Zamakhshari, Imam Baydawi, Imam Nasafi, Imam Biqa`i, and others.
[Razi, Mafatih al-Ghayb; Jamal, Hashiyat al-Jalalayn; Zamakhshari, Kashshaf; Baydawi, Anwar al-Tanzil; Nasafi, Madeira al-Tanzil; Biqa`i, Nadhm al-Durar]
“The verse, therefore, can by no means be generalized to refer to all disbelievers. Such an interpretation is not confirmed by scholars of Qur’anic interpretation. It would be both contrary to the intent of the verses as well as disastrous for the security of both Muslim and non-Muslim citizens and nation-states.”
Militants do not follow Sunni tradition. They contradict Sunni tradition.
The Varieties of “Jihad” Today
It is interesting to note how the neo-conservatives and other Islamophobes supported an offensive – pre-emptive – war against Iraq under flawed pretexts, which killed more people than all of the offensive jihads in Islam’s history. Like the militants they condemn, they also bipolarize the world into good and evil. Related to this matter, the issue of the division of the world divided into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufr is important to understand.
The Bipolar View of “Jihadists” and Neo-conservatives
“Muslim” terrorists today do not have a sophisticated understanding of the Sunni categorization of the world and the political and related factors associated with it. Ironically and contrary to Sunni tradition, terrorists dichotomize the world simplistically just as neoconservatives do.
Indeed, the division of the world is not allegedly unique to Islam, or religion, in general. Price says,
“…the division of the world into an in-group and an out-group…is not unique to religion, as it is also a characteristic of groups involved in ethnic conflict and secular conflicts.”[]
“Religion’s dichotomizing tendency,”he continues, “was certainly present in the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union. However, competing economic systems, capitalism, and communism, not faiths, were the ideological forces that stoked a 45-year global conflict that led to the brink of nuclear war with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, the division of Europe into competing blocs, and wars by proxy throughout the developing world.”[] The analogy of Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kufrcan be applied to both opposing sides in the Cold War.
Similarly, scholar, author, and ex-CIA officer Graham Fuller says,
“Jihad in its more modern usage has been applied to many quite secular tasks, just as the term ‘crusade’ in English is casually applied to fighting crime or a campaign against drugs”[]
Neo-conservative Islamophobes paradoxically counter Islamist ideology from an ideological perspective of their own that, some would argue, is just as extreme, and which has outlived its perceived usefulness. Their view of themselves as “good” and the Soviet Empire as “evil” (and now all Islamists as “evil”) illustrates the division of the world as two opposite extremes, similar to the views of the “jihadis” they claim to oppose.
As discussed in this section, the Islamophobes and their partners — the “Muslim” terrorists – are oblivious to the differences between classical jihad and today’s terrorism, which is incorrectly described as “jihad.”They fail to note the differences between the geo-political environments in classical Islam’s time and contemporary times, omit the details of jihad and the differences with today’s so-called “jihad” by radicals, and conflate both.
Sunni tradition is not upheld by radicals, but ridiculed, marginalized, and selectively used to deceptively portray loyalty to the tradition. Islamophobes and “Muslim” terrorists are unable to distinguish between the peaceful majority of Muslims and the violent minority that claims to act in Islam’s name. Their understanding also reflects a Muslim-versus-non-Muslim conflict, whereas Muslims have battled each other and allied with non-Muslims in past and present conflicts.
[] Ahmed Al-Dawoody. The Islamic Law of War: Justifications and Regulations. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. pg.78.
[] Qamar-ul Huda. Crescent and Dove: Peace and Conflict Resolution in Islam. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010..p.48
[] Joseph E. B. Lumbard. (ed.) Islam, Fundamentalism, and the Betrayal of Tradition: Essays by Western Muslim Scholars. Bloomington, Ind.: World Wisdom, 2009. pg.34.
[] Mustafa Akyol. Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty. New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2011. p.65.
[] Ira M. Lapidus. A History of Islamic Societies. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1988. p. 43.
[] Thomas Arnold. The Spread of Islam in the World A History of Peaceful Preaching. S.l.: Goodword Books, 2001. pg.46.
[] Marshall G.S. Hodgson. The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization The Classical Age of Islam. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974. pg.199
[] J. Lumbard. op. cit., p. 33
[] Zaid Shakir, “Jihad is not Perpetual Warfare,” New Islamic Directions, 2008, accessed May 27, 2013,http://www.newislamicdirections.com/nid/notes/jihad_is_not_perpetual_warfare.
The original article can be read in Shakir, Zaid. Scattered Pictures: Reflections of an American Muslim: An Anthology of Essays. Hayward, Calif.: Zaytuna Institute, 2005. pp.121-141.
[] Ian, Almond. Two Faiths, One Banner: When Muslims Marched with Christians Across Europe’s Battlegrounds. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009. pp.1-2.
[] M. Akyol, op. cit., p. 67.
[] J. Lumbard. op. cit., p. 22.
[] John L. Esposito. The Future of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. p.155.
[] The New Mardin Declaration, March 28, 2010, accessed May 20, 2013,
[] J. Lumbard. op. cit., p. 34.
[] Scott Helfstein, Nassir Abdullah, Muhammad al‐Obaidi, “Deadly Vanguards: A Study of al-Qa’ida’s Violence Against Muslims,” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. December 2009, accessed June 12, 2013,http://www.humansecuritygateway.com/documents/CTC_DeadlyVanguards_StudyOfAlQaidasViolenceAgainstMuslims.pdf
[] Muḥammad Tahir ul-Qadri. Fatwa on Suicide Bombings and Terrorism. London: Minhaj-ul-Quran International, 2010. p. 154.
[] Ibid., p.163.
[] Ibid., p.164.
[] Joas Wagemakers, “Reclaiming Scholarly Authority: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Critique of Jihadi Practices,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34(7) (2011): 523-539.
[] This is an authentic hadith related by Tirmidhi, Abu Dawud, Nasa’i, Ibn Maja, Ahmad, Ibn Habban, and others. For an explanation of the hadith, see Faraz, Rabbani, “Is the hadith: ‘The scholars are the inheritors of the Prophets’ authentic? If so, what does it mean?” Seeker’s Guidance, March 15, 2011, accessed May 22, 2013,
[] Sahih Bukhari: Vol.2, Book 26, No. 594.
[] M. ul-Qadri, op. cit., pp. 101-102.
[] Q. Huda, op. cit.,p. 47.
[] M. ul-Qadri, op. cit., p.101.
[] Ibid., p.100.
[] Daniel E. Price. Sacred Terror: How Faith Becomes Lethal. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger, 2012. p.29.
[] Ibid., p.28.
[] G. Fuller, op. cit.,p.275.