A. S.362/7036 dated 9 Feb 07.
B. S.362/7039 dated 12 Feb 07.
C. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 15 Feb 07.
D. S.362/7082 dated 19 Feb 07.
E. HQ NAIC/172/1/A dated 20 Feb 07.
F. HQ NAIC/172/1/A dated 21 Feb 07.
G. S.362/A/7118 dated 23 Feb 07.
H. HQ NAIC/172/1/A dated 26 Feb 07.
I. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 6 Mar 07.
J. NA/449/1/A dated 6 Mar 07.
K. S.362/A/7151 dated 13 Mar 07.
L. HQ NAIC/172/A dated 20 Mar 07.
M. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 21 Mar 07.
N. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 10 Apr 07.
O. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 18 Apr 07.
P. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 27 Apr 07.
Q. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 9 May 07.
R. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 10 May 07.
S. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 5 Jun 07.
T. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 6 Jun 07.
U. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 18 Jul 07
V. HQ NAIC/42/1/G dated 29 Aug 07.
W. NA/COAS/52 dated 8 Oct 07.
X. NA/COAS/52 dated 25 Sep 07.
Z. NA/COAS/52 dated 25 Sep 07.
AA. NA/COAS/52 dated 10 Oct 07.

1. On 21 Sep 07, there was a report made by 2005NA/55/1870 Pte Zamani
Adamu deployed as guard at 1OSD Jaji. The soldier reported that the Government
Seals of the entrance into the depot had been broken and he suspected the removal
of some items. The report was made to the CO, Lt Col HT Wesley (N/9376). The
CO immediately detained the 2 guards that were on duty at the Depot on the fateful
day and a formal report was made to ASA. The COAS subsequently set up a BOI
headed by Maj Gen MS Saleh (N/5551) to investigate the incident vide Reference
W. The COAS also convened a separate independent investigation by NACMP
into the case. HQ NAIC also found it necessary to conduct a investigation into the
matter with a view to coming up with security implications of the issue.

2. The decision to of HQ NAIC to conduct a parallel investigation into the
matter is because, prior to the 21 Sep 07 incident at OSD Jaji, the NAIC had cause
to investigate a related case earlier this year. The case involved Maj SA Akubo
who incidentally is the prime suspect in the OSD Jaji incident. He happens to also
be a key suspect in the earlier investigation.

3. The earlier investigation was triggered off with the request for Maj Akubo
and others by the DSS in relation to their suspected involvement with an arms
trafficker that was being investigated by them. The investigation was never
properly conducted nor concluded however. Interestingly, the recent OSD Jaji
incident suddenly point to a possible link to the earlier DSS investigation. NAIC
investigation is therefore necessary; in order to explore among other things, the
possible links between these two investigations. It is also to bring out a broader
picture that will facilitate better understanding of the incidents. NAIC
investigation is deliberately intended to differ in focus and emphasis from the other
on going investigations of the OSD Jaji incident.

4. The OSD Jaji incident is presumably viewed from criminal perspective by
other on going investigations. However, intertwined with the criminal perspective
are plethora of national security and political implications associated with the
incident, thus justifying the NAIC approach. This report is therefore the result of
the investigation conducted by NAIC which evaluated the probable linkages
observed between the 21 Sep 07 incident at Jaji and the earlier one reported by
DSS regarding security breaches at 1BODK. The broader national security
implications and threats to military security associated with these security breaches
have been brought out in this report. Also, the probable complicity of some senior
military officers and politicians in these incidents has been clearly identified; and
recommendations made at the end.

5. The aim of this report is to appraise the COAS with the linkages between the
21 Sep 07 at OSD Jaji with the earlier incident reported by DSS regarding security
breaches at 1BODK with a view to bringing out the national security implications
and make recommendations.

6. Prior to the 21 Sep 07 incident at OSD Jaji, the DSS investigated a case with
regards security breaches at 1BODK earlier this year. The DSS wrote to the NA
requesting witnesses vide Reference A. The witnesses were all NA personnel and
were to be interviewed for their financial connections with a suspected illegal arms
trafficker under investigation. The DSS did not give any more details of the
investigation. They did not also point to the fact that the investigation was with
regards security breaches at 1BODK.

7. The then COAS, Gen AO Azazi directed the then DMI, Maj Gen RO
Adekhegba to act on his behalf vide his comment on Reference D. HQ NAIC
acted promptly by facilitating the release of the officers to appear for the DSS
interview. Additionally, the HQ NAIC observed the need for military intelligence
officers be part of the investigation and made formal requests to the DSS to partake
in the investigation vide References F and H. However, there is nothing on record
to indicate that the DSS obliged or even responded to the requests. Evidently, they
were silent about it. The then DMI did not also pursue it further.

8. HQ NAIC facilitated the appearance of all the invited witnesses before the
DSS investigation. They were all released to go back to their units after the
interviews. The DSS did not however intimate the NA or NAIC of their findings.
Neither did the NA nor NAIC request for any feedback. However, the then DMI,
Maj Gen RO Adekhegba directed that the only officer among the invitees be cross
examined after his release in order to possibly find out the details of the
investigation. A staff officer at HQ NAIC subsequently cross examined Maj
Akubo. Couple of reports were submitted to the DMI highlighting the sensitivity of
the case and recommending further investigation and liaison with the DSS on the
matter, but these reports were rejected by the DMI. The final report recommended
among other things, the release of the officer back to his unit. The DMI accepted
this and promptly approved the recommendation. The NAIC investigation
terminated there despite recommendations advising the need to investigate further.

9. The recent OSD Jaji incident however necessitated a critical review of the
investigation conducted by HQ NAIC with regards the DSS investigation.
Interestingly, this review betrays the probable complicity of Maj Gen Adekhegba
by virtue of the role he played as DMI in failing to cause proper investigation to be
conducted on the matter. Details of this and the roles that others played will be
discussed in subsequent paragraphs. However, details of the investigation into the
OSD Jaji incident will first be discussed in order that the links between these two
issues are better understood.

10. In the course of the investigation of the OSD Jaji incident, the following
facts emerged:
a. Maj SA Akubo and his accomplices have been supplying arms to Mr
Sunday Bowei Okah for onward transfer to the Niger Delta militants from
the year 2000 to 2007 (about 7 years).
b. The arms were systematically stolen from 1BODK and 1OSD Jaji
over the years and details of what has actually been stolen has not been
c. Confession of Maj Akubo reveal that the quantity of arms received by
Mr Bowei from Maj Akubo and his accomplices is estimated to be between
6000 to 7000 arms of all types including rifles (all types), GPMGs, UMGs
and rocket launchers.
d. Mr. Bowei paid Maj Akubo monies cumulatively put at over N100
million for the arms deals.
e. The arms store is usually opened with the original or copied
duplicates keys; and the stolen arms are usually conveyed outside the Depot
in an Isuzu truck with a concealed compartment or in a disguised sewage
disposal truck.
f. Maj Akubo, Sgt Mathias, LCpl Alexander, LCpl Moses and LCpl
Nnamdi are principal suspects in this incident and were among the people
invited by DSS for interview in connection with their links with an illegal
arms trafficker who turns out to be Mr. Bowei.
h. A case of missing arms had previously been reported at 1OSD and a
BOI which Maj Akubo was a member presented a skewed report to cover up
the discrepancies discovered.
11. The facts above clearly point to the connections between the OSD Jaji
incident; with the earlier DSS investigation; and thefts at 1BODK. A total of 10
apprehended suspects involved in the arms thefts were interviewed. The snapshot
of the interview and involvement of each of them is as follows.
Maj SA A kubo (N/9860)
12. Maj Akubo is the principal suspect. He was posted to 1BODK in 1999 and
he served there until 2005. He deposed that he came across Mr Sunday Bowei
Okah 􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀱􀁒􀁙􀀃􀀔􀀜􀀜􀀜􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁏􀁖􀁒􀀃􀁐􀁈􀁗􀀃􀀰􀁕􀀃􀀫􀁈􀁑􀁕􀁜􀀃􀀲􀁎􀁄􀁋􀀞􀀃􀀶􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁄􀁜􀂶s elder brother in Lagos
in 2006. He claimed to have met Mr. Sunday Bowei in 1 Div Officers Mess in the
Year 2000 during the first Kaduna riot. He disclosed that Mr Bowei was then
13. Akubo claimed to have entered into some business relationship with Mr
Bowei who was into the business of supplying musical equipments. He further
stated that they entered into a sort of partnership of supplying POL products from
NNPC Kaduna through one Mr Ambuka. Mr Ambuka was said to have provided
them with a loan of about N 7.5 million to execute several contracts with agreed
repayment terms.
14. Sometime in Feb 04, Mr Bowei approached Maj Akubo that he had a job he
was doing for former Governors Ibori and Alamieseigha which involved the
sourcing of arms. He subsequently agreed to supply arms to Mr Bowei. First, in
Apr 04, he gave Mr Bowei 150 rifles made up of Cetme, G3 and Mark IV types.
On a second occasion, he went together with Mr Bowei to 1OSD where they
carried another 200 rifles; and subsequently, 300 more rifles of mixed types on the
third occasion. He mentioned Sgt Mathias as one of the soldiers on duty during
one of the times that he personally visited the Depot to pick the weapons.
15. All the weapons were collected with an Isuzu Pick-up truck with a hidden
compartment which belonged to Mr Bowei. He further stated that he personally
gave out about 700 rifles to Mr Bowei and he was paid a total of N15 million for
the 3 deals he executed. He disclosed that he stopped going to the Depot but
referred linked up Mr Bowei with Sgt Mathias for subsequently deliveries.
Subsequent deliveries were carried out using either the Isuzu Pick-up vehicle or a
sewage disposal truck. Payments were done through bank lodgments from Lagos
Mr. Sunday Bowei Okah
16. He is the main link between the soldiers and the militants of the Niger Delta
in the supply of arms. He is an ex-boy of NMS Zaria. He was at NMS from 1981
to 1986. He got admitted into the NDA and started out there but did not graduate.
He is thus familiar with the workings of military environments which he exploited
to his advantage. He is the younger brother of Mr Henry Okah otherwise known as
􀂵􀀭􀁒􀁐􀁒􀀃􀀪􀁅􀁒􀁐􀁒.􀂶􀀃 Henry Okah is a prominent leader of the Niger Delta militants and
an illegal arms trafficker with international connections. He is reported to have
been recently arrested in Southern Africa for alleged gun running and money
17. Mr Sunday Bowei began dealing in arms through Maj Akubo. He claimed
to have initially started with Maj Akubo but discovered that he was rather too
expensive and subsequently began going directly to the soldiers who were easier
and cheaper to deal with. He was quoted to have stated that together with his boys;
Joshua, Amos and Papa, they collected a total of between 6000 to 7000 weapons of
all types including rifles, GPMGs, UMGs and rocket launchers from 1999 to
around 2006. He also claimed to have paid over N 100 million to Maj Akubo and
several other sums of money to the soldiers during the period the deals took place.
He also derived a lot of financial benefits from governments􀂶 arms recovery
exercise, by trading relatively old and damaged Cetme and Berretta rifles at
N250,000 each. These were part of the stocks stolen from 1 BODK.
97NA/9616 Sgt Mathias Peter
18. The soldier reported to 1BODK in Jan 98 and was deployed to the
Technical Store. He briefly worked at 1OSD around Nov 03 before he was
redeployed back to 1 BODK. He deposed that during his brief stay there, and on
one occasion, Maj Akubo visited while he was on duty with LCpl Nnamdi Anene.
He gave them a telephone handset each to go on surveillance near the Jaji main
gate and alert on any ordinance personnel approaching the depot while he was
19. He eventually went back to the depot after sometime and he met a civilian
with Maj Akubo and a vehicle and they collected some magazines and weapons
which they loaded in the vehicle and left. Maj Akubo subsequently asked Sgt
Mathias to see him at home which he did. He showed him a cheque of N300,000
and he gave him N80, 000 after it had been cashed as his share of money realized
from the deal. He also claimed that between 2005 and 2006, LCpl Alex invited
him to a hotel in Kaduna where he met Mr Bowei. A deal was eventually struck
for supply of 60 Berreta rifles from 1 BODK. He executed this by copying the
keys during one of the fatigue days at one of the sheds where the weapons were
kept. He gave the key impressions to LCpl Alex who went to Kaduna town to
make duplicates. He subsequently removed the 60 rifles without magazines which
he loaded into 3 bags and with the assistance of Cpl Mohammed Aliyu who was on
duty that day. He used his car to remove the rifles from the depot. They were paid
N120, 000 as against N150,000 agreed upon because Mr Bowei said the rifles had
no magazines. He promised to pay the balance when the magazines were supplied.
Sgt Mathias claimed to have received N30, 000 as his own share from the deal.
79NA/16781 L Cpl Lawrence Okpe
20. The soldier is currently serving at NAOCS (TB) Ojo. He once served at
1OSD Jaji from 1989 to 2001 and was deployed for general duties; fatigue and
guard duty, at the depot. He alleged that sometime in year 2000, his OC then Capt
SA Akubo visited his duty post when he was on duty alone. The officer was in the
company of a civilian thought to be Mr Sunday Bowei in a private vehicle. The
officer told him they came to collect some items. The officer came along with the
keys of the sheds and the second gate. LCpl Okpe opened the first gate for him
and the civilian to gain access into the Depot while he used his keys for the second
gate. The officer took 30 AK 47 rifles. LCpl Okpe assisted them in loading the
rifles into the vehicle. No money was paid to the soldier. Maj SA Akubo has
however denied the account of LCpl Okpe.
97NA/45/4618 L Cpl Alexander Davou
21. The soldier was posted to 1 BODK on 2 Apr 98 and deployed on GD tasks
of guard duties and fatigue at 1 OSD Jaji. Sometime in Oct 05, Pte Nnamdi Anene
introduced LCpl Alexander to Mr Sunday Bowei and the arms deal. LCpl
Alexander subsequently met Mr Sunday in Adrials Hotel in Kaduna from where
the deal for supply of 50 AK 47 rifles was arranged. He identified LCpl Moses,
Sgt Mathias and LCpl Nnamdi as his associates in subsequent arms deals. The
collection of the first consignment of 50 AK 47 rifles was done one of the days he
was on duty. Mr Bowei and his boys collected the weapons with his Isuzu pick-up
truck. The sum of N250,000 was given to him as payment for the rifles.
22. On the second occasion, he linked Sgt Mathias up with Mr Bowei and they
negotiated for 60 Barretta rifles for N150, 000. The assignment was done by
copying the keys of one of the sheds at 1BODK. The duplicate keys were used by
LCpl Alexander to gain access into the shed at a convenient time. Subsequently,
60 rifles without magazines were loaded into a sack by Sgt Mathias and the items
were removed from the depot at night using Cpl Mohammed 􀀤􀁏􀁌􀁜􀁘􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁕. Cpl
Aliyu was on duty at the gate on that day. They were paid only N120, 000 for this
deal because the rifles had no magazines. His share from the deal was N30,000.
23. On a third occasion about Feb/Mar 06, he met Mr Bowei at Adrials Hotel
and a deal for 100 G3 rifles for N350,000 was agreed upon. The deal was done
with Sgt Mathias; and LCpl Caleb who was on duty at 1 BODK on the day. They
eventually supplied Mr Bowei with only 65 G3 rifles and 6 GPMGs. Mr Bowei
then paid the sum of N350,000 in two instalments of N150,000 and N200,000.
LCpl Caleb got N50, 000 and Sgt Mathias got N120,000 for this deal.
24. On 19 Sep 07, LCpl Alexander received a call from Mr Bowei informing
that he was at Aso Motel, and he needed 100 Cetme rifles. LCPl Caleb who was to
be 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁗􀁜􀀃 􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀀲􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀀫􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀀃 􀀥􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁎􀁒􀀃 􀀮􀁄􀁇􀁘􀁑􀁄􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀀕􀀓􀀃 􀀶􀁈􀁓􀀃 􀀓􀀚 was contacted.
They arranged for removal of the rifles on 21 Sep 07. The OSD arms store was
subsequently broken into as usual and 100 Cetme rifles were removed and loaded
􀁌􀁑􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀰􀁕􀀃 􀀥􀁒􀁚􀁈􀁌􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁕􀁘􀁆􀁎􀀑􀀃 􀀃 􀀲􀁑􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁌􀁕􀀃 􀁚􀁄􀁜􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀀮􀁄􀁇􀁘􀁑􀁄􀀏􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁜􀀃 􀁚􀁈􀁕􀁈􀀃 intercepted and
apprehended by DSS operatives
79NA/32008 Cpl Mohammed Aliyu
25. The soldier was posted to 1 BODK in the year 2000 and deployed as a store
man. Sometime in Nov 05, he was on duty at the gate of 1 BODK. Sgt Mathias
was the duty SNCO. Sgt Mathias approached him that he needed assistance to
convey some items outside the depot. He subsequently made his car available and
they used the car to load 3 bags containing 60 Berretta rifles. He was paid N30,000
as his role.
26. LCpl Moses was posted to 1 BODK in Jan 98. As a qualified storeman B1,
he was initially deployed at Vision 2010, 􀁅􀁘􀁗􀀃􀁚􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁏􀁄􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁖􀁖􀁌􀁊􀁑􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀀃􀀤􀁎􀁘􀁅􀁒􀂶􀁖􀀃
orderly. He confirmed that sometime in 2004/2005, while on duty at 1OSD, Maj
Akubo called him on phone that he would be visiting to carry out some checks at
the Depot. He eventually came with two civilians and requested the gates to be
opened. Maj Akubo went into the Depot with the civilians to remove what he
described as scraps. LCpl Moses did not question Maj Akubo because he was the
acting CO and SPO. Maj Akubo gave LCpl Moses the sum of N100,000 in the
evening of the next day.
27. On another occasion, Maj Akubo sent LCpl Moses and Cpl Kola David to
wait for him at the Jaji main gate while Maj Akubo went into the Depot to remove
some weapons. He confirmed to have received N70,000 from Maj Akubo and
believe Cpl David may have been given the same amount. On yet another
occasion, Maj Akubo came while he was on duty with LCpl Nnamdi. Maj Akubo
was with the two earlier mentioned civilians and they left with a load of
unspecified quantities of weapons. On this particular occasion, there was a fire
outbreak that was caused by on un-extinguished cigarette butt thrown away by
LCpl Nnamdi. The fire was put out by them with the assistance of other people
around at the time. Maj Akubo gave him N100,000 the next day.
2002NA/52/5191 L Cpl Nnamdi Anene
28. LCpl Nnamdi Anene was posted to 1 BODK in 2003 and deployed to 1OSD
Jaji for general duties. He deposed that one day while he was on duty at the Depot
with LCpl Mohammed, Maj Akubo came with a sewage vehicle, some civilians
and a ladder and claimed that they had come to fix the electrical problem at the
Depot. Maj Akubo sent him to Kaduna to take a bunch of keys to someone. On
delivering the message, LCpl Nnamdi returned to the Depot and met them loading
the sewage vehicle with weapons.
29. On the second occasion, while he was on duty with Sgt Mathias, they were
given telephone handsets by Maj Akubo to mount surveillance and report on any
ordnance personnel or suspicious individuals that may approach the Depot while
he was inside. When they dismounted from duty, they both met Maj Akubo at
home and were given N80,000 each as their share from the deal. On the third
occasion he was on duty with Cpl Kola when Maj Akubo came again, gave them
telephone handsets and sent them away on surveillance. They suspected that some
rifles were taken away. LCpl Nnamdi later met Maj Akubo in the office the next
day and was given N45,000.
30. On the fourth occasion Maj Akubo came with Mr Bowei and a sewage
vehicle. They loaded a substantial quantity of rifles before leaving the depot. This
time around, no money was given to them. On another occasion, Mr Bowei came
with a Honda Car and he paid an advance fee of N40,000; collected LCpl
􀀱􀁑􀁄􀁐􀁇􀁌􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃 􀀬􀀧􀀃 􀁆􀁄􀁕􀁇􀀃 which was to be returned after delivering some
weapons. Mr Bowei􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁅􀁒􀁜􀀃􀁚􀁌􀁗􀁋􀀃􀀯􀀦􀁓􀁏􀀃􀀤lexander later came with their Isuzu pickup
truck and loaded some rifles while LCpl Nnamdi stood away on surveillance.
He was promised to N120,000 but got only N100,000.
31. Additionally, sometime in 2006 while he was serving at Bakassi in Calabar,
Mr Bowei called to discuss an arms deal. He subsequently approached Cpl
Emmanuel Taathi who was the armourer. He intimated him of the request by Mr
Bowei and they spoke directly on phone. Cpl Emmanuel then promised to remove
AK 47 rifles from the ones back-loaded from Ikang that had not yet been recorded.
Mr Bowei boys Papa, Amos and Joshua later came with a Volvo car in which Cpl
Emmanuel loaded 25 AK 47 rifles and some ammunition in black leather bags into
the vehicle. LCpl Nnamdi was later informed about the successful loading of the
items. Thereafter, LCpl Nnamdi arranged with one soldier Osita Ihesinachi to
assist him drive the vehicle outside the barracks. Unfortunately, the vehicle broke
down and Ihesinachi who was suspicious of its contents reported to one MP
soldier; LCpl Solomon. He was compelled to settle LCpl Solomon with N24,000.
He shared N 26,000 with Ihesinachi from the total of N50,000 paid as advance for
the deal. The total deal was for N270,000. He gave Ihesinachi N70,000, Cpl
Emmanuel N50,000 and he kept N100,000 from the balance of N220,000 that was
a Honda Accord car and 15 AK 47 rifles were removed by Cpl Emmanuel and
loaded into the vehicle. The payment for this deal was N50,000.
2003NA/54/4472 L Cpl Emmanuel Taathi
32. The soldier is currently serving in 2 BODI. From 16 Feb 06 to Jul 06, he
served in Bakassi as part of OP HARMONY IV. While at Bakassi, one Cpl Tunde
who was the armourer was RTU and he was drafted by Maj Cole to take over as
armourer from Cpl Tunde. He deposed that LCpl Nnamdi introduced him to one
soldier; Lcpl Tunji Ahmed that wanted to buy a fragmentation jacket. They
eventually sold a jacket to LCpl Tunji and N3,000 was paid for the item. On
another occasion, 5 fragmentation jackets were given out and no money was paid
for them. LCpl Emmanuel however denied ever removing some weapons from the
arms store for sale to Mr Bowei and his boys.
96NA/44/8839 Pte Bawa Caleb
33. The soldier was posted to 1BODK in 2001. He stated that sometime in 2005
at about 2000hrs, LCpl Alexander approached him for an arms deal. They
subsequently went to 1OSD Jaji and linked up with Sgt Mathias to remove some
rifles from the Depot. He was given N50,000 as his own share from the deal.
34. In addition, on 20 Sep 07, Cpl Alexander once more approached him where
he was performing guard duty at the 􀀦􀀲􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁒􀁘􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁗􀀃􀀥􀁄􀁇􀁌􀁎􀁒􀀃􀁌􀁑􀀃􀀮􀁄􀁇􀁘􀁑􀁄􀀃􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁒􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀀃
deal with Mr Bowei. He accompanied LCpl Alexander to visit Mr Bowei at the
hotel where he was staying. Mr Bowei gave them N10,000 which they shared
and some Mark IV rifles as well. He opened the gate and broke into the Depot,
and together with LCpl Alexander facilitated the removal of the items. They were
promised N800, 000 for the deal. While LCpl Alexander was escorting the stolen
weapons to Kaduna that they were arrested by the DSS operative.
79NA/28134 Cpl Kola David
35. The soldier was posted to 1BODK and deployed as QM. He stated that one
day while he was on duty at 1OSD Jaji with LCpl Nnamdi, LCpl Moses informed
him that Maj Akubo asked them to wait for him at the Jaji main gate. He further
deposed that he called Maj Akubo on phone to find out why he should wait at the
gate with LCpl Nnamdi. Eventually, he saw Maj Akubo come out with a vehicle at
the gate and he challenged him as to the contents of the vehicle. The officer
claimed that they only came to collect swords and that he should see him in the
office the next day. The next day, LCpl Nnamdi informed him that Maj Akubo
gave him N45, 000 after seeing him in the office. LCpl Kola also saw him in the
office on the pretext that he was taking some vouchers to him for his signature.
The officer did not say anything and no money was given to LCpl Kola David.
36. Having discussed the details of the OSD Jaji incident and established the
connection with the thefts at 1BODK which incidentally turns out to be the basis
for the DSS earlier investigation, it is important to now discuss the details of the
probable roles of Maj Gen Adekhegba and others in either facilitating the thefts or
preventing investigation or both.
37. The then DMI, Maj Gen RO Adekhegba directed what can now be termed as
a quick investigation into the matter when Maj SA Akubo was released by the
DSS. The way the investigation was directed by the Maj Gen Adekhegba betrays
the fact that he either is oblivious of the sensitivity of the case or just did it for the
records without the intention of getting to the root of the matter. This is evident
from the fact that the investigation HQ NAIC conducted was never formally
convened but verbally authorized. It was also a one man investigation. One would
have expected that the DMI convene a full inquiry into the matter considering the
seriousness of the case as observed by him in paragraph 2 of Reference H which is
his letter to the DSS arguing that NAIC officers should be allowed to partake in the
investigation. For him to turn around and authorize a somewhat quick
investigation raises more questions than answers.
38. 􀀶􀁌􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁜􀀏􀀃 􀁇􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁆􀁒􀁘􀁕􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀀃 􀀱􀀤􀀬􀀦􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀁈􀀃 􀁐􀁄􀁑􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗ion, Maj Gen
Adekhegba observed the shallowness of one of the draft report submitted to him as
evident from his comment on Reference O. He however turned around to approve
the recommendation for the release of the officer with his comment on Reference
U, albeit having noted that the report is 􀂳􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀂴. One wonders
why a DMI who is a Major General would turn around and authorize the closure of
a case by approving the release of the prime suspect after he himself has observed
the incompleteness and shallowness of the report. This happens also to be a report
of the case that he wrote to DSS arguing for the participation of NAIC officers in
the investigation due to its sensitivity and potential for 􀂳􀁉􀁄􀁕􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃
for military secur􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀂴 􀀶􀁈􀁈􀀃􀁓􀁄􀁕􀁄􀁊􀁕􀁄􀁓􀁋􀀃􀀕􀀃􀁒􀁉􀀃􀀵􀁈􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀀫􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀰􀁄􀁍􀀃􀀪􀁈􀁑􀀃􀀤􀁇􀁈􀁎􀁋􀁈􀁊􀁅􀁄􀂶􀁖􀀃
exact comment on Reference U is 􀂳􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀀃􀁌􀁖􀀃􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀑􀀃􀀃􀀷􀁋􀁌􀁖􀀃
is not an investigation. However, Approved to put a stop to the charade you
􀁆􀁄􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁊􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁒􀁉􀁉􀁌􀁆􀁈􀁕􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀁘􀁑􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀀑􀂴 This comment
speaks volume. It imply that the DMI authorized the closure of a case that he
himself observed to be sensitive with 􀂳􀁉􀁄􀁕􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁄􀁆􀁋􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃 􀁌􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁌􀁆􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁒􀁕􀀃 􀁐􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁕􀁜􀀃
􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀂴 􀁍􀁘􀁖􀁗􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁓􀁘􀁗􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁖􀁗􀁒􀁓􀀃 􀁗􀁒􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀂳􀁘􀁑􀁓􀁕􀁒􀁇􀁘􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁖􀁘􀁉􀁉􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁑􀁊􀁖􀂴 after
having qualified the investigation to be 􀂳􀁌􀁑􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁓􀁏􀁈􀁗􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃􀁖􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁏􀁒􀁚􀀄􀂴􀀃􀀃
39. It is apparent from the foregoing that Maj Gen RO Adekegba has questions
to answer about how he managed this investigation from the start. He did not
definitely exploit all the channels available to him to obtain the full picture of the
case from the DSS despite all the leverages he could have used by virtue of NAIC
network and by virtue of being a member of the JIB. He also did not give the
investigation the attention it deserves. He obviously has a command responsibility
on that and must be made to answer for his command failures. Interestingly, he is
going to end up getting a national merit award having being nominated by Gen
40. Gen AO Azazi was the COAS during the period that the DSS requested for
Maj Akubo and others to help their investigation. All correspondences from the
DSS in relation to the case were addressed to him and not to the DMI or HQ
NAIC. However, on Reference D he directed through his comment that DMI
should facilitate the release of the officers to the DSS, find out why they were
looking for them and also respond on his behalf. The exact text of his comment is
􀂳􀀳􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁆􀁌􀁏􀁌􀁗􀁄􀁗􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁏􀁌􀁄􀁌􀁖􀁈􀀃 􀁎􀁑􀁒􀁚􀀃 􀁚􀁋􀁜􀀑􀀃 􀀵􀁈􀁖􀁓􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃 􀁒􀁑􀀃 􀁐􀁜􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁋􀁄􀁏􀁉􀀑􀂴 This is an
evidence to show that he delegated full responsibilities of actions on this case to
the DMI Maj Gen RO Adekhegba. It is doubtful therefore that the DMI may not
have been updating him on the progress. If this has been happening, there is
nothing on records to indicate that. However, it is not expected that the DMI will
approve the release of Maj Akubo with an incomplete investigation of a case that
has probable negative implications on military security without clearing from the
41. Similarly, Gen Azazi, being a professional military intelligence officer who
rose to become the DMI understands fully the implications of not investigating the
case to its logical conclusion. One wonders then, what transpired between him and
Maj Gen Adekhegba that warrant the closing of the case. The period of the arms
theft that Maj Akubo masterminded at 1BODK fall within the period of Gen
handled in order that Gen Az􀁄􀁝􀁌􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁇􀀃􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁘􀁕􀁈􀁖􀀃􀁐􀁄􀁜􀀃􀁕􀁈􀁐􀁄􀁌􀁑􀀃􀁘􀁑􀁇􀁌􀁖􀁆􀁒􀁙􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁇􀀢􀀃􀀃􀀧􀁌􀁇􀀃
Gen Azazi use course mate influence on the then DG of DSS Lt Col LKK Are (rtd)
to ensure that the case remain suppressed? Otherwise, why did it take until now,
when Are is no more in office for the DSS to reopen the case and be willing to
cooperative fully with the NA? Gen Azazi obviously has more questions to answer
regarding his roles in this case considering the key appointments he held during the
period of the theft. Gen Azazi has already nominated Maj Gen RO Adekhegba for
national merit award, probably as a reward for his role in ensuring that his
complicity in this issue remains undiscovered.
42. The role of NAIC in this particular case is very important. NAIC failed to
discover the theft while it was going on over the years. This is attributed to
involvement in politics. NAIC had over the years lost its capability and capacity
for military security functions. NAIC instead, focused and became expert in
political matters. This obviously affected the way barracks and military
installations are being monitored by NAIC thus facilitating the kind of incident
exemplified by this case. NAIC must therefore share part of the blame for
allowing the theft to happen due partly to its misplaced attitude and priorities over
the years.
43. Nevertheless, it must be noted that NAIC does not operate in a vacuum. It is
guided and directed by its leadership who is in turn directed by the COAS. Taking
􀀱􀀤􀀬􀀦􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀁉􀁄􀁌􀁏􀁘􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁉􀁕􀁒􀁐􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀁌􀁑􀁖􀁗􀁌􀁗􀁘􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃 􀁓􀁈􀁕􀁖􀁓􀁈􀁆􀁗􀁌􀁙􀁈􀀃 􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃 􀁚􀁌􀁏􀁏􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀀃 􀁄􀀃 􀁖􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁒􀁘􀁖􀀃
mistake because it will not allow for blame to be put on the blameworthy. Besides,
it will be too simplistic to just blame the institution of NAIC in a very sensitive
case like this. The leadership of NAIC during the period of this serious security
breach must be held accountable. Only the will subsequent leadership learn to rise
up to their responsibilities.

44. This report will be incomplete without touching on the role of the NAOC.
The NAOC is the custodian of the 1BODK and indeed all ordinance deports of the
NA. The amount of stolen weapons so far mentioned in this case is an
approximation and not exact. Also, the fact was obtained from the interrogation of
Maj Akubo and his accomplices. It becomes necessary to therefore ask if NAOC
is aware of the extent of what is missing from their inventory.
45. The COAS recently directed security surveys of all arms depot across the
country. It is doubtful if these surveys will be in a position to ascertain any
discrepancies in inventories over the years considering the length of time given to
them to complete their assignments. It is necessary therefore that NAOC be
mandated to come up with a comprehensive accounting for all weapons of the NA.
This will probably open us more to what other breaches have occurred and
necessitate correction.

Links with Bakassi and Other Locations
46. This investigation reveals the existence of arms theft in Bakassi. Though
there was no much detail to the Bakassi theft, it goes to say that theft of arms has
become established business in our military locations, especially operational areas.
One wonders how much theft would have gone unnoticed in Bakassi, Liberia,
Sierra Leone and other operations. If the magnitude of theft uncovered in this
investigation happened in a location like Kaduna, one wonders what would be
happening in operational areas where events are fluid and go mostly unnoticed. It
is important therefore to look at this theft comprehensively and not in isolation.
The Role of Senior Politicians
47. At least the name of two senior politicians, former governor of Delta State,
James Ibori and former Bayelsa State governor, Dapriye Alameisiagha have been
mentioned in this investigation. There may be many more. These two politicians
are mentioned as the financiers for the arms acquisition project. Certainly, they
would not have provided large sums of money without knowing the source of the
weapons. Simply put, a serious breach of security of this magnitude was
deliberately masterminded by state governors. This gives a serious political
dimension to the case. It is therefore important that care is taken in idenfying all
possible political linkages to this case with a view to uncovering all the politicians
behind this project. Politicians can aspire to any position in Nigeria. One wonders
what would happen if Nigeria ends up with a president who does not believe in the
entity of the Nigerian nation, and has a record of involvement in cases like this.
Identifying politicians with complicity in this or similar case will help in ensuring
that they are blacklisted and prevented from vying for or taking higher offices
because of the implications that could arise.

48. The discovery of these breaches to military security has raised a number of
issues that have direct bearing on national security. These can be categorized into
four distinct categories as follows,
a. Threat to Public Safety and Law and Order: The kinds of
performance being displayed by Niger Delta militants and indeed criminals
around the nation certainly have direct relationship with the amount of stolen
and illegal weapons currently in circulation. Little wonder that militants
could overpower security forces and go on rampage as evident from the
recent state of insecurity in Port Harcourt. The amount of weapons stolen
are enough to hold not just Port Harcourt hostage, but the whole of Nigeria.
Should criminals decide to spread out to major cities of Nigeria with just a
few of these weapons and cause chaos simultaneously, it is doubtful if we
will not have a national state of emergency situation in our hands.
b. Threat to Military Security: The circumstances surrounding
this case and the fact that the theft continued undetected for several years
betrays the level of insecurity of our military locations, and the deterioration
of discipline among personnel. For this to happen within the vicinity of a
military HQ like 1Div, the amount of security breaches happening in other
remote locations could best be imagined. Moreover, if this can happen to!
the NA, what more of our sister services and the Nigeria Police whose
security measures and procedures are presumably not as thorough as that of
the NA. The implication of this is simply that the nation can no longer rely
on its armed and security forces because, if we cannot effectively secure our
vital assets from theft or our personnel from subversion and compromise,
how then can we be relied upon to secure the nation?
c. Threat of Protracted Insurgency and Secession: The potential that
this theft could lead to a protracted insurgency situation in the Niger Delta
region and indeed a possibility of secession attempt is very apparent. The
rhetoric of the Niger Delta militants with regards their being as well
equipped or even more equipped than the security forces should not be taken
for granted in the light of the discovery of this theft. Those bold rhetorical
statements could well have been with the tacit knowledge of how well armed
they are. It is now clear that what makes them stronger inadvertently
weakens the military and security forces because they steal from us.
d. Threat of Convergence with International Ter rorists and
T ransnational Organized Criminal Gangs: The convergence of
international terrorism with transnational organized criminal gangs is
beyond doubt. For example, there are documented cases of Al-􀀴􀁄􀁈􀁇􀁄􀂶􀁖 and
􀀫􀁄􀁐􀁄􀁖􀀃 􀁗􀁈􀁕􀁕􀁒􀁕􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁖􀂶 involvements in diamond and arms trafficking with
Liberian and Sierra Leone rebels. The possibility therefore exist that these
criminal gangs stealing from military inventories and selling to Niger Delta
militant may for whatever reason be lured into dealing with terrorists or
international criminals. The perfection with which these arms thefts have
been conducted over several years indicate a probability that the same
network perfect more serious breaches to security. The implication of this is
very apparent considering what is going on around the world. The security
implications 􀁒􀁉􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁉􀁗􀁖􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁕􀁈􀁉􀁒􀁕􀁈􀀃􀁊􀁒􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁜􀁒􀁑􀁇􀀃􀀱􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑􀁄􀁏􀀃􀁖􀁈􀁆􀁘􀁕􀁌􀁗􀁜􀀑􀀃􀀃
There are genuine causes to be concerned for regional and international
security also. The involvement of senior government officials and highly
placed politicians in the incident further complicates the issue and could
invite a serious backlash from the international community against Nigeria if
49. Apart from the four major categories discussed above, there are other
important areas of concern which deserve mention because of their potential to
impact negatively on military security. These include but not limited to the
a. A large quantity of arms are in circulation and are in the hands of
Niger Delta militants for use against own troops in OP RESTORE HOPE.
b. The large quantity of arms stolen and supplied to militants will
encourage their determination to source for ammunitions from other military
locations, security agencies and any other source available.
c. The large quantity of heavy weapons like GPMGs, UMGs and rocket
launchers indicate that own troops in OP RESTORE HOPE are confronted
with militants that are better equipped.
d. The level of compromise and complicity of the officer and the soldiers
involved in these security breaches indicate that NA vetting of personnel in
sensitive duties is either not being carried out or ineffective.
e. HQ NAOCS and other NA departments charged with the custody of
arms and ammunition failed in their responsibility of monitoring the stocks
in their inventory.
f. The security measures and procedures at the Ordnance Depot are
either not being implemented or ineffective.

50. An evaluation of the 􀀱􀀤􀀬􀀦􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁄􀁕􀁏􀁌􀁈􀁕􀀃investigation report has revealed quite a
few security lapses. In the first place, the report brought out the existence of what
is now apparent to be an arms theft syndicate within the army. The syndicate has
been conveniently operated by Major SA Akubo with the tacit complicity of
soldiers recruited by him. This syndicate has been discovered to have been in
operation for about 7 years. The culprits confessed that over the years, close to
7,000 assorted weapons were stolen by them and conveyed to the Niger Delta
51. The purpose of stealing these weapons has been identified to be primarily in
furtherance of the Niger Delta militancy cause. Money is however the prime
motivator of those junior ranks who took part in the incident, although, this cannot
strictly apply to the officer. Obviously, this act betrays the existent of a well
orchestrated plan. Be it as it may, this investigation raises more questions than
answers. There are a number of primary intelligence questions that need to be
answered in order to get to the heart of this issue.
52. For example, some of the questions that readily come to mind include, how
wide is the network? Are they also operating in other arms depots across the
country? To what extent have other officers in the Ordnance Corps or elsewhere
been compromised? What is the level of theft at Bakassi? What is the role of the
Intelligence in this? How about the Nigeria Police and other paramilitary
inventories? Have they also been compromised? How about the inventories of the
Navy and the Air Force? Have they also been compromised? How much
compromise has been done to the arms for cash project?
53. These questions are just a few that readily come to mind while reading the
report. A lot more will emerge if a deliberate scientific approach is used.
Moreover, answers to some questions are bound to naturally raise more questions.

54. The sensitivity of this case raises a lot of questions and issues. There are so
many of them that it will be unrealistic to mention all of them here. However,
there is a particular issue which in our opinion deserves to be mentioned here even
if it is for the records considering the linkages associated with this case and the
possibilities that could arise. This issue is what we term as a conspiracy theory.
The conspiracy theory believes that there is a link between the 1989 aborted Orkar
coup; the 2001 Ikeja Cantonment arms depot explosions; the arms theft at 1BODK
and the militancy in the Niger Delta. It is believed that there is an orchestrated
plan by the Niger Deltans to secede from Nigeria which is being played out over
the years with every opportunity they have. It is also believed that they took
maximum advantage of the unique opportunity they had with the successive
appointments of Gens Ogomudia, Asemota and Azazi as GOCs 1Div.
55. Moreover, it is within this period that Gens Azazi and Adekhegba were
􀀧􀀰􀀬􀀑􀀃 􀀃 􀀤􀁉􀁗􀁈􀁕􀀃 􀁅􀁈􀁆􀁒􀁐􀁌􀁑􀁊􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁈􀀃 􀀦􀀧􀀶􀀏􀀃 􀁌􀁗􀀃 􀁌􀁖􀀃 􀁕􀁈􀁓􀁒􀁕􀁗􀁈􀁇􀀃􀁗􀁋􀁄􀁗􀀃 􀀪􀁈􀁑􀀃 􀀤􀁝􀁄􀁝􀁌􀂶􀁖􀀃 􀁑􀁒minee for the
position of CDI is Maj Gen Adekhegba. This is the same Adekhegba that has been
reported to have downplayed a similar investigation during his tenure as D Ops at
the DIA when he was a colonel. If really there is a master plan that is being
executed, there can never be a better opportunity to leverage it.
56. Gen Azazi is also reported to have convened two separate BOI to investigate
breaches related to arms and ammunition in 1DIV AOR. One was during his
tenure as the GOC while the other was during his tenure as the COAS. Could
􀁗􀁋􀁈􀁖􀁈􀀃􀀥􀀲􀀬􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁋􀁄􀁙􀁈􀀃􀁅􀁈􀁈􀁑􀀃􀁆􀁒􀁑􀁙􀁈􀁑􀁈d to cover up something? One wonders why the
reports remain inconclusive and recommendations unimplemented.
57. Perhaps one of the most serious issues that need urgent attention is the issue
of publicity with regards this theft. It is needless to emphasize that the Niger Delta
advocacy proponents have better publicity strategies than the government. It has
been suggested that this issue should be handled in a secretive manner in order to
avoid bad publicity to the NA and the government due to the embarrassment of the
extent of the theft. It is our opinion however that this is a wrong advice.
58. In as much as this issue deserve to be carefully handled, we do not have the
luxury to keep it under cover. Besides, the Niger Delta propaganda machinery can
effectively take the initiative from us and use it for their campaign despite the
evidences available. While the investigation is on going therefore, deliberate
efforts must be made to come up with strategies that the NA and the government
can use to better promote their case. The COAS must therefore ensure that
relevant information about this issue are released to the press and made public only
in a timely and well coordinated manner. There must be a psyops and public
affairs approach to how this issue will be made public.
59. Additionally, HQ NAIC believes that,
a. The arms deal has been going on for a much longer time than what
has been discovered so far.
b. More soldiers cutting across the NA may be involved in arms deal to
militants, armed robbers, social miscreants involved in communal crisis and
political thugs.
c. The soldiers of 1 BODK supplied mostly arms; the ammunitions to
use the weapon with may have come from other ordnance depots, military
units, the Police and other security agencies to arm the militants in the Niger
d. The current arms deal involving soldiers of 1 BODK may have been
the major source of arms supply to fuel the crisis in the Niger Delta Region.
e. The prolonged stay of Maj Akubo and some of the soldiers at 1
BODK may have made it easy for them to be compromised and perpetrated
their illegal deals without being detected for so long.
f. The NAOC may have covered several incidents or reports of
unreconciled returns, which was why this incident took a long time before it
was detected and reported.
g. Maj Akubo and the soldiers may have supplied much more arms and
ammunitions than they admitted before the investigation team.
h. Maj Akubo and the soldiers of 1 BODK may have derived much more
financial benefits from the arms deal than they admitted before the
investigation team.
i. Had periodic inspection and checks of arms and ammo been properly
done by the NA, the arms deal could have been uncovered much earlier than
j. The earlier investigation done by HQ NAIC and the SSS may not
have had enough information and facts to have indicted the soldiers of 1
BODK and they were thus released.
60. The discovery of arms theft at 1BODK is very unfortunate. Close to 7,000
assorted weapons are reported to have been stolen over the years. The theft is also
not an ordinary theft. It is part of the Niger Delta militancy agenda thus making it
part of an orchestrated plan. The national security implications of this theft impact
directly on public safety and law and order. Threats to military security and threats
􀁗􀁒􀀃􀀱􀁌􀁊􀁈􀁕􀁌􀁄􀂶􀁖􀀃􀁈􀁛􀁌􀁖􀁗􀁈􀁑􀁆􀁈􀀃􀁄􀁖􀀃􀁄􀀃􀁑􀁄􀁗􀁌􀁒􀁑 also become real with this issue. Similarly, the
possibility of convergence of these criminals with international terrorists and
organized criminal gangs exist.
61. The roles of Gen Azazi and Maj Gen Adekhegba in not ensuring that the
case was promptly given the attention it deserve when it was first brought to light
by the DSS shows a leadership failure on the part of the two senior officers. It is
important that they are made to account for and take responsibility for their actions
for posterity. The NAIC also will require to be reorganized with a view to
refocusing it properly to perform its assigned roles that have hitherto been
neglected. The NAOC must also be made to give accurate accounts of the arms in
its custody over the years. While attention must be paid to arms security in all
operations that NA participate in.
62. This case brings to light the possible involvement of politicians in the breach
of military security. While, it is advised that pursuing this could be politically
sensitive, it is important that it is properly investigated with a view that Nigeria
does not end up with politicians who are anti-Nigeria in high positions. It is also
important that the conspiracy theory linking previous breaches of security with this
one be properly looked into with a view to identifying possible patterns of these
breaches. Care must also be taken to ensure that information about this case is
properly managed.

63. In view of the foregoing, the COAS is invited to consider the following
a. Sanction Maj Gen Adekhegba for his role of not authorizing proper
investigation into this case when it first came to his notice.
b. Withdraw the nomination of Maj Gen Adekhegba for consideration
for a National Award due to his role in this colossal intelligence failure that
occurred when NAIC was under his watch.
c. Advice government to sanction Gen Azazi appropriately.
d. Ensure that Maj SA Akubo is carefully managed with a view to
extracting valuable information from him with regards his accomplices
among senior government officials and politicians.
e. Ensure that the criminal aspects of this incident are not politicized so
that culprits will be made to serve maximum punishment and/or sanctions.
This will serve as a deterrent to others and will covey the message that there
are no sacred cows in law.
f. Advice government to authorize investigation into the involvement of
senior politicians in this issue.
g. Ensure that all conspiracy theories are properly investigated with a
view to ascertaining their authenticity.
h. Cause NAOC to properly account for all weapons put in its custody
with a view to ascertaining the actual extent of the theft and other security
i. Direct the NAOC to review its current methods of accounting and
verification of arms and ammunition in the light of the lessons learnt from
this breach.
j. Direct NAIC to review its security procedures for barracks and
installations in the light of the lessons learnt from this breach.
k. Direct NAIC to review its vetting processes and procedure with a
view to evolving a scientific and more robust method of vetting personnel.
l. Direct NAIC to revitalize its security investigation unit (Security
Group) with a view to repositioning it for better performance.
m. Direct the upgrading of all armouries to standards that will deter and
prevent breaches as well as facilitate investigations. Special assistance could
be sought from the government and our foreign partners on this.
n. Recommend to government the need to look at this theft beyond the
NA. A lot more could have happened or be happening in the NN, NAF, the
NP and other armed paramilitary organizations. If the NA could be
penetrated these other organizations certainly would.
o. Recommend to government the need to pay attention to the political
implications of this theft.
p. Advise government to suspend and stop all pending and future arms
importation by all services and agencies until proper verification and
accounting for existing inventories have been completed and security
measures enhanced.
q. Seek government approval for the DSS and EFCC assistance in
monitoring of the telephones and bank accounts of all senior
military/government official and politicians implicated in this case with a
view to ascertaining other linkages and the extent of their network.
r. Direct that the operational plan in the Niger Delta region be reviewed
with the aim of incorporating psyops and public affair in the plan.
s. Ensure that our foreign partners and other important international
stakeholders with interest in the Niger Delta issue, are fully informed and
constantly updated, about this issue. This will facilitate their cooperation
and understanding with respect to punitive measures that may be taken
against prominent figures involved in the theft.


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