February 17, 2016 David Albright and Serena Kelleher-Vergantini
Despite the passage of Implementation Day, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was unable to form a conclusion about the nuclear weapons related activities that took place at a site in the Parchin Military Complex. Although the IAEA found that Iran did have a nuclear weapons program at least until 2009, it made that conclusion without understanding large parts of Iran’s alleged work on nuclear weapons or establishing a precedent for its inspectors to access military sites and personnel to verify past or possibly on-going nuclear weapons-related activities.
This uncertainty undermines the credibility of its verification efforts. Is the IAEA going to re-visit the Parchin site? If so, when? And will IAEA inspectors be granted physical access to the site in order to take environmental samples given that the ones taken by Iranians without the presence of IAEA inspectors were inconclusive? Moreover, Iran has committed under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) not to conduct high explosive activities related to the development of a nuclear explosive device, including the type of high explosive testing alleged to have occurred at Parchin.
The IAEA needs to demonstrate that it can verify these JCPOA commitments, including accessing military sites like Parchin, where such activities could routinely take place.
Read the full report parchin_after_implementation_day_february_17_2016_final